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THE CONTINUING DEBATE ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
J. Kirkland Grant*
THE MODERN CORPORATE MANAGER: RESPONSIBILITY AND
REGULATION. By William A. Groening. New York: McGraw Hill.
1981. Pp. xii, 274. $24.95.
THE LIMITS OF CORPORATE POWER: EXISTING CONSTRAINTS ON
THE EXERCISE OF CORPORATE DISCRETION. By Ira M. Millstein and
Salem M. Katsh. New York: MacMillan. 1981. Pp. xx, 265.
$19.95.
The debate on the role of governmental restrictions on business
corporations is as old as corporations themselves. When the modem
American business corporation came of age early in the nineteenth
century, federal and state enabling legislation restricted corporate
power, much as the English precedents dating back to the exploration and trading corporations of Elizabethan times had done. 1 Although the location, form, and scope of these restrictions have
changed dramatically over time, there is little doubt that the debate
between proponents and opponents of the restraint of private enterprise will continue throughout the 1980s. Large' corporations dominate the economic scene in the United States,2 and multinational
enterprises - most privately owned, but some having a state ownership interest - have come to dominate the world economy. The
very size of these enterprises and the domestic and political impact
* Dean and Professor of Law, The Delaware Law School of Widener University. B.B.A.
1965; J.D. 1967, University of Michigan. - Ed.
1. Of course, the history of the American corporate form of doing business must refer to
the Dartmouth College case, Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
518 (1819), where the state attempted to restrict the powers previously granted the college by
the legislature in the Dartmouth charter. Chief Justice Marshall found such an attempt unconstitutional as an abridgment of contract. Thereafter, enabling legislation has normally
contained a reservation of power to meet just such a situation. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 555 (10th ed. 1980).
2. In the second quarter of 1981, corporate profits in the United States totalled $187 billion. SURVEY OF CURRENT Bus., Aug. 1981, at 1 (the Survey is a publication of the Bureau of
Economic Analysis, United States Department of Commerce). In 1974, 72% of the profits and
66% of the sales of all United States industrial firms were attributable to the 500 largest industrial corporations. See R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORA-.
TION 16 (1976). The profits of the Fortune 500 largest industrial companies totaled $81.2
billion in 1980. FORTUNE, May 4, 1981, at 322.
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of their attendant power are a source of considerable public concern.
The debate thus centers on the ownership and control of this economic power and how it should be regulated - by the free enterprise economy or through governmental constraints. Two questions
are particularly relevant. First, should these enterprises be permitted
to continue to combine and grow? And second, must governmental
regulatory schemes also grow larger and more complex to adjust to
the size of the large corporations? Or is there some middle ground,
where a corporation and the government can properly respond to
society's legitimate demand for efficient services and fairly priced
quality products? The authors of both The Modern Corporate Manager and The Limits of Corporate Power have given some focus to
this debate on corporate size and governance.

I
The scope of the coverage in both books is striking. Groening,
retired corporate counsel of the Dow Chemical Company, ostensibly
addresses himself to the civil and criminal sanctions applied to all
levels of the corporation - the enterprise and its officers, directors,
and other managerial personnel who have day-to-day responsibilities. This personal approach is in contrast to the more theoretical
coverage of Millstein and Katsh, both partners in a New York City
law firm. They examine the legal aspects of government regulation,
but also discuss the economic, political, and social environment in
which private enterprise must operate today. Both books deal with
existing constraints on corporate power, Groening in sometimes
painful detail, Millstein and Katsh generally and philosophically.
The authors all try to carry forward the debate over the advisability
of more (or less) governmental restraint on corporate activity. Millstein and Katsh note:
Undoubtedly, some readers will conclude that a sufficient number of
effective constraints exist in all (if not too many) areas, while others
will assert the inadequacy of the present matrix [of corporate freedom
of action and statutory or economic constraint] on both quantitative
and qualitative grounds. And there will obviously be a wide spectrum
of opinion in between. What we stress here is only that a complex
matrix of constraining forces [limiting the exercise of a large corporation's power in any or all areas] does exist, and that if the country is
seriously concerned about the issues of corporate size and governance,
it behooves us all to enter the discussion with a solid basis of facts
about the accountability of corporations today. [P. xx.]
Whatever side one takes in the debate - for or against more govern-
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mental regulation of corporations - all will surely find a wealth of
interesting material in both books.
Both texts discuss the effect of governmental influence on corporate decision-making (what I believe Groening would call government interference). Each finds the scope of governmental regulation
to be quite pervasive. Millstein and Katsh give several illustrations,
including:
- The General Accounting Office has identified one hundred and
sixteen federal agencies with regulatory responsibilities, and simply
cataloging the myriad different programs takes hundreds of pages. [P.
129.]3
- [F]ederal laws and regulations seeking to achieve environmental
goals have over the past ten years mandated an enormous allocation of
capital resources to the protection and enhancement of the environment. Many companies have been forced to spend as much as 20 percent of their capital and 10 percent of their operating budgets for
pollution control. [P. 166.]4
-The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act5 • • • requires that corporate activities designed to influence the passage of legislation must
be disclosed. This alone can serve to diminish the flexibility available
to the corporation since it may decide it would prefer not going on
record with respect to a particular issue. [P. 201.]

What these points fail to draw to the reader's attention is that
most regulatory measures adopted by Congress or the state legislatures were enacted to correct perceived corporate abuses (Groening,
p. 264). These measures are the products of a delicate balancing process. On the one hand, society is increasingly suspicious of the uses
to which the very powers it has granted corporations are being put.
We resist nationalization or overregulation, but are equally repelled
by corporate libertinism. On the other hand, the larger corporations
grow, the more important to the national interest their performance
becomes. Consequently, corporations and the government must
work together to find an acceptable middle road (Millstein & Katsh,
pp. xvi-xvii). How these competing interests will ultimately be re3. (Citing

OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, FEDERAL
PROGRAMS AND ACI'IVITIES (1978)). The authors then select a limited number
of areas as illustrations of the governmental regulation phenomenon: labor relations, including occupational safety and health, pp. 147-66; environmental laws, pp. 166-78; consumer protection of the FfC, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, and consumer credit laws, pp.
178-96; the political process, including campaign financing, corporate lobbying activities, and
foreign corrupt practices, pp. 196-206; and an energy discussion of information gathering,
price regulation, conservation and encouragement of technological development through direct federal loans or investment and encouragement of private investment, pp. 206-20.
4. (Citing [1978) 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1378-79).
5. 2 u.s.c. §§ 261-270 (1976).
REGULATORY
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solved is far from clear. In 1932, Professors Berle and Means
predicted:
The rise of the modem corporation has brought a concentration of economic power which can compete on equal terms with the modem state
- economic power versus political power, each strong in its own field.
The state seeks in some aspects to regulate the corporation, while the
corporation, steadily becoming more [economically and politically]
powerful, makes every effort to avoid such regulation. Where its own
interests are concerned, it even attempts to dominate the state. The
future may see the economic organism, now typified by the corporation, not only on an equal plane with the state, but possibly even superseding it as the dominant force of social organization.6

They thought that the political power of corporations would quickly
grow to match their economic power.
It is interesting to note that Berle and Means's 1968 revised edition, in contrast to their 1932 volume, concluded that the twentiethcentury American economic revolution had made the corporation a
dominant form of organization and production, but had left it a relatively neutral political force. 7 Since 1968, however, the situation has
changed. Corporate organizations, such as the Business Roundtable
(one of the sponsors of the Millstein book), as well as individual corporations, have become more politically active. One only has to
open general circulation magazines and newspapers to see public interest, nongeneric advertising on issues of social concern, bought and
paid for by America's largest corporations. Probably the most
widely known are the multi-media advertisements of the Mobil Corporation concerning wide-ranging issues in the energy field. Continued attempts to influence public opinion by corporations will no
doubt have some impact on legislation and consequent government
regulation. The conclusion of Berle and Means that corporate power
is politically neutral, therefore, will bear close scrutiny.

II
In attempting to resolve this central problem, the two books take
very different approaches. Each is directed at a different audience.
Groening writes for modem corporate managers - those who
through their activities will cause legal sanctions to be visited on the
corporation and possibly themselves. A detailed checklist examining
many diverse areas of civil and criminal law is the result. This
6. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 357
(1932).
7. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY at XXV•
xx.vi (rev. ed. 1968).
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checklist traces corporate and individual responsibility, sometimes in
excruciating detail. It is doubtful, for example, that any corporate
manager will want to know all of the facts of a 1973 Louisiana
Supreme Court decision8 on the liability of a corporate manager, as
a principal, for the activities of subordinates. It is similarly doubtful
that the manager will peruse the details of section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,9 the discussion of which covers ten
pages, as opposed to just one paragraph covering shareholder proposals under rule 14a-8 10 of that same statute. In fact, it seems likely
that Groening overwhelmingly emphasizes those areas of governmental regulation with which he was concerned while general counsel of Dow Chemical. Food and drug regulation, environmental
regulation, the securities laws (particularly the provisions of the 1934
Act concerning insider stock transactions), and ERISA, 11 are given
very detailed discussion, much beyond that required to give managers insight into the legal rules and sanctions affecting their employment behavior.
Millstein and Katsh, on the other hand, have resisted an author's
normal tendency to write about everything that he has experienced
in a given area and have thus produced a much more readable text.
The Limits of Corporate Power attempts to sketch the economic, social, and political limits on a corporation's power to act, and is not
merely a checklist of the various regulations affecting corporations.
Both texts are well-researched and impressively footnoted. The
serious reader will appreciate the trouble that the authors have taken
in the footnotes to draw attention to the applicable statutes and
agency regulations, as well as to the important commentary of legal
scholars. Mr. Groening approaches his sources as a classical corporations scholar, citing many of the well-known leaders in the field
since the 1930s. He uses the works of Berle and Means, Alfred Conard, William Cary, Ernest Folk, and the treatment of corporate
problems in the major law reviews, including the American Bar Association Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law's Business Lawyer, to illustrate the principles that he outlines. Millstein
and Katsh have adopted a more modem approach in their thoughtful text. While they, too, cite the 1970s articles discussing the role of
the corporation, their volume is mea1;lt to stimulate the reader's
8. P. 14 (discussing Canter v. Koehring Co., 283 So. 2d 716 (La. 1973)).
9. 15 u.s.c. § 78p (1976).
10. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1981).
11. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976
& Supp. III 1979).
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thought by general consciousness raising. As noted above, both
volumes provide citations to regulations and statutory sections in
massive detail. I often wondered if this was really necessary, especially in the Millstein and Katsh book. Groening includes the citations because he hopes that his readers - corporate managers who
are not legally trained - may find them helpful as they confront
particular problems in their day-to-day activities.
Both books discuss the regulations relating to the creation, structure, and management of the corporation, including the limited liability and management roles of shareholders, officers, directors, and
managers. 12 Groening then examines the penalties visited on corporations and their managers for violations of the laws relating to regulated industries, antitrust, products liability, the environment, employee relations, and the securities laws. 13 Because of his emphasis
on the individual liability of the director, officer, and manager, he
also discusses indemnification and liability insurance. 14 Millstein
and Katsh, after discussing the creation and structure of the corporation, look to the economic constraints of the free market (including
the antitrust and securities laws), restraints on business activities inherent in the federal tax system, and the direct regulation of corporate decision-making through the labor, consumer protection,
energy, political activity, and regulated industries laws. 15
As one would expect from the backgrounds of the authors of
both texts, additional governmental regulation of the corporation is
not encouraged. I particularly enjoyed the Millstein and Katsh volume because it so thoroughly questioned regulatory policy. Chapter
three, for example, examines the federal tax system's influences on
the discretionary powers of corporate managers. The chapter emphasizes the tremendous influence that the tax system has on corporate decisions relating to capitalization, mergers and other
acquisitions, capital investment, employment, political activity, foreign operations, and the like. Although there is little discussion of
the effect that state tax laws have on these decisions, 16 the federal
income tax consequences of business decisions seem generally well
covered. The analysis of tax policy in light of congressional intent is
Millstein & Katsh, ch. I; Groening, chs. 1, 2 & 3.
Chs. 4-9.
Ch. 11.
Chs. 2-4.
16. A major concem of corporations today is tax abatement, forgiveness, and any other

12.
13.
14.
15.

measures by which local and state taxing authorities provide incentive for corporate location
and specific action that may create jobs.
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particularly interesting. The authors consider several examples to
determine whether the particular tax provision was intended to influence corporate decision-making. For example, they examine the difference between debt and equity financing, and note that the
corporation is allowed no deductions from its income for dividends
paid, but that interest on debt is normally deductible (pp. 89-91).
They conclude:
There is no indication Congress intended the tax system to bias corporate capitalization decisions toward debt financing . . . . [Furthermore,] the more highly dependent a corporation is on debt, the more
vulnerable it becomes to pressures from creditors and to financial difficulties in periods when the economy is weak . . . . [I]t will be placed at
a disadvantage relative to a corporation that is not as heavily ''leveraged." . . . Beyond these implications, moreover, the fact that corporations are encouraged by the tax laws to incur debt may mean that the
equity market is in a sense artificially constricted. [P. 90.]

Over-reliance on debt financing is a side effect of the tax laws that,
with the consequent depression in the equities market, has in tum
produced "much of the increased merger activity in recent years" (p.
91). In carefully explaining the complex relationships among tax
and other business laws, Millstein and Katsh have provided a real
service.
In the area of tax constraints on decision-making, however, it is
amazing how many aspects of the discussion in both books need to
be updated as a result of the 1981 changes in the tax law.17 New
incentives for capital investment have resulted from changes in the
tax treatment of capital gains at a maximum long-term rate of
twenty percent, which will significantly affect the willingness of individuals and businesses to dispose of real property, plant and equipment, as well as securities; from improved depreciation and research
and development write-offs; from the new asset life assumptions for
depreciable property; from changes in individual and Keogh Retirement Plans; and from the change permitting a ten percent charitable
contribution deduction (raised from five percent) to encourage corporate largesse at a time when individuals will probably donate less
to charity because of changes in the estate tax laws. 18
I found the coverage in both books of corporate governance and
social responsibility especially stimulating. Both comment on the
oft-charged anticorporate bias in the news and broadcast media.
This bias, the authors conclude, has placed corporations in a position
of having to justify to the public at large both their existence and
17. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172.
18. See Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172.
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their economic power. In light of proposed new federal regulatory
statutes and revisions of old ones, this bias is likely to become more,
not less, important. Millstein and Katsh illustrate the bias against
corporations with a quotation from an article in the Harvard Business
Review:
Broadly speaking, mass media news selection and interpretation feeds
the public's suspicions about corporate practice (with a certain amount
of help from business malefactors), and interprets corporate affairs
with a negative bias. This situation has prompted the choruses of antimedia hates that dominate many business panel sessions and conversations . . . . There is . . . a long standing bias against corporate business in the general media. . . . The reasons are complicated and
range from simple ignorance of corporate practice to a mindless pursuit of the kinetic or sensational. 19

As a result of this activity, Millstein and Katsh conclude, "the prospect of hostile press reports must be taken into account by corporate
management in the decision-making process" (p. 233). This is not a
ground-shaking conclusion, but a very practical one often overlooked by corporate decision-makers. Both books take the optimistic view that the multinational corporations can accomplish much in
influencing public opinion. Groening, in particular, believes that
they can perhaps even reverse the trend toward overregulation (p.
254).

III
The real strength of both texts appears to be in the concluding
essays. Again, similarities crop up. Both discuss the need for corporate managers to attune themselves to society's needs and to recognize social values espoused by different constituencies within society.
To the extent that the corporation's activities are able to respond to
the needs and perceptions of society regarding responsible economic,
employee, customer, investor, and related corporate behavior, the
pressure for additional governmental regulation will lessen.
The corporate organizational structure, it has been argued, is not
responsive to public concerns. If it is true that boards of directors
have essentially abdicated their function as watchdogs of management (Groening, p. 233), and managers are not responsive to society's
needs, as argued by many critics of corporations in the 1970s, forced
change will take place.20 In fact, both authors recognize the emer19. P. 232 (citing BanJcs, Taking On The Hostile Media, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1978,
at 123, 125, 129) (where the original and the reprinted versions differ, the text follows the
original).
20. One of the prime critics of corporate behavior has been Ralph Nader. However, he has
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gence of a new class of directors in the large corporation, one representing a particular constituency. While "public interest" directors
as such have probably not yet been selected, leaders of groups not
formerly represented on corporate boards, such as unions, consumer
groups, and minorities, have •been placed on various corporate
boards as a result of an increased awareness by corporate management that it is better to respond voluntarily to society's perceptions
than to be forced to do so through legislated change.21
The optimism of Groening and of Millstein and Katsh is contagious. American business has succeeded because of the profit motive, which encourages individual initiative. A balance between
corporate initiative and responsibility to the public as well as to investors and coworkers has become an accepted price for their continuing to do business in their present form. As a new generation of
corporate managers takes the helm in the 1980s, most of us believe
that they will be responsive to societal needs. 22 If the events in
Washington during the past year have any bearing, government regulation at the national level will decrease. It is too early to tell
whether this deregulation will result in adverse economic consequences, such as wide-scale bankruptcies of now unregulated commercial airlines or interstate truckers, or economic success, like that
which followed the deregulation of the railroads; or if unregulated
corporate activity will be socially detrimental because uncontrolled
corporations will ignore their social and economic responsibilities.
But if corporations are inherently evil because they are motivated
solely by profit, society will again rise up and demand governmental
constraints on corporate decision-making. In fact, pervasive abuses
in the private sector might well cause the government to take over
large corporations representing important segments of the national
economy. Both books offer sobering appraisals of this possibility.
However, those who manage the large multinational and domesbeen joined by distinguished commentators, such as former SEC Chairman and Columbia
University Law School Professor William Cary, in calling for federal chartering and attendant
internal regulation oflarge American companies. See R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN,
CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE CORPORATION (1976); R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN,
supra note 2; Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
663 (1974); Cary, A Proposed Federal Corporate Minimum Standards Act, 29 Bus. LAW. 1101
(1974).
21. The constituency director phenomenon is discussed in Groening, pp. 236-47, and very
generally in Millstein & Katsh, p. 229.
22. For other perspectives on the reform of corporate boards of directors, see, e.g., Conard,
Reflections on Public Interest Directors, 15 MlcH. L. REV. 941 (1977); Haft, Business Decisions
by the New Board: Behavioral Science and Corporate Law, 80 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1981); Solomon, Restructuring the Corporate Board ofDirectors: Fond Hope - Faint Promise?, 16 MICH.
L. REV. 581 (1978).
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tic corporations that control significant elements of our domestic and
world economy have shown themselves to be responsive to the needs
and desires of society. As long as a dialogue exists between the critics of the modem large corporation and corporate managers, internal
responses to perceived problems can be achieved. Society expects
much from the corporation and its management. It has become clear
that the pursuit of profit can no longer be the only goal of the American corporation. But if corporations govern themselves with prudence and awareness, governmental action constraining their
behavior should be unnecessary. The authors of both volumes have
provided information concerning corporate behavior that will help
to create a meaningful dialogue on governmental regulation. This
dialogue may, in time, result in reforms that adequately control corporate behavior without resort to complicated and burdensome
regulations.

